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Abstract: We propose and experimentally test two tractable methods to incentivize the elicitation 
of private information: Benchmark and Coordination. Both mechanisms capitalize on the false 
consensus effect, a well-documented phenomenon that follows Bayesian reasoning. That is, 
individuals use their own type when predicting the type of others. Since it is not feasible to 
incentivize the elicitation of private information using facts, when these are not verifiable, we 
incentivize the respondent to reveal her perceptions about others and use that statement to predict 
the subject´s private information. The stronger the relationship between a subject´s type and her 
perception about the type of others, the more effective the mechanisms are in revealing the subject´s 
privately held information. In an experiment, we apply the mechanisms to reveal beliefs about 
probabilities. On the aggregate level, both mechanisms accurately reveal mean first-order beliefs 
of the population. On the subject level, the modal difference between probabilities elicited in either 
mechanism and actual first-order beliefs is zero. The results indicate that subjects strongly anchor 
their statements in Benchmark and Coordination on their private information. 
 
Highlights: 
• Two tractable methods to elicit private information are proposed 
• The methods serve as (simple) alternatives to Bayesian revelation mechanisms 
• In an experiment, both mechanisms accurately reveal first-order beliefs 
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1. Introduction 
The elicitation of private information, such as preferences, beliefs, feelings or opinions, is key for 
social sciences (Turner and Martin, 1985), policymakers (Veenhoven, 2002), corporations (Monroe, 
1973) and for public opinion research (Price and Neijens, 1997).1 The value of such data requires 
that subjects exert effortful thinking when the question at hand is non-trivial and that subjects do 
not bias their answer towards social desirability (Li, 2007; Manski, 2004; Zizzo, 2010). Therefore, 
various methods have been proposed that condition a respondent´s answer on some observable fact 
and monetarily reward the subject for accuracy. 2  If the monetary incentive is sufficient, the 
mechanism is incentive compatible, as the subject is induced to honestly report her type (Smith, 
1976).3 
 Incentivizing accurate reporting by conditioning on facts, however, limits a mechanism to the 
elicitation of private information about verifiable questions. 4  By contrast, the elicitation of 
unverifiable questions lies beyond the scope of this approach. This comprises questions that are 
hypothetical, counter-factual, technically unverifiable, or which refer to subjective tastes. 5 
Therefore, so-called truth serums have been developed, which aim at increasing the quality of the 
elicitation of private data compared to non-incentivized procedures (Prelec, 2004).6  The core 
assumption of these methods is that individuals are subject to the false consensus effect (Ross et 
al., 1977), a well-documented phenomenon that follows Bayesian reasoning (Dawes, 1989).7 That 
is, individuals use their own private information when predicting private information of others.8 
 
 1 In particular, this kind of data is also essential for corporations that offer online platforms to gather and provide 
customer evaluations, e.g., about restaurants, hotels or other services. 
 2 See Schlag et al. (2015) and Schotter and Trevino (2014) for literature reviews. 
 3 The term type is meant to represent the respondent’s trait that is of interest to a researcher. This might be a 
respondent´s preference, belief, taste, opinion, and the like. 
 4 For example, a health scientist might ask a respondent about the risk of smoking or an economist about the current 
inflation rate. The respondent is then paid based on the objective precision of the answer. 
 5 In these cases, interviewers are usually limited to the elicitation of non-incentivized statements. 
 6 Indeed, there is evidence that incentives for truth-telling induce subjects to report socially desirable behavior less 
often (Barrage and Lee, 2010), admit wrong-doings more often (John et al., 2012; Loughran et al., 2014), state their 
future behavior more accurately (Howie et al., 2011), increase accuracy in recognition tasks (Prelec and Weaver, 2006) 
and increase the coherence between elicited beliefs and observed behavior (Trautmann and van der Kuilen, 2014). 
 7 In the title, we put the word “false” in parentheses, in order to remark that it is not necessarily false to derive beliefs 
about others using the signal that stems from one´s own type (Dawes, 1989). Instead, rational belief formation requires 
that (to some degree) subjects use their own type as a valid source when predicting the type of others (see also Prelec, 
2004). Section 3.1.2 elaborates on that. 
 8 This assumption is also common in various Bayesian settings (e.g., Cremer and McLean, 1988; d'Aspremont and 
Gerard-Varet, 1979; Johnson et al., 1990; McAfee and Reny, 1992; McLean and Postlewaite, 2002). 
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Given that a set of behavioral assumptions holds, truthfully answering the question is a Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium and maximizes the recipient´s payoff. 
 However, the application of this group of mechanisms comes with two difficulties. First, they 
require several behavioral assumptions, such as common knowledge about a shared common prior 
belief, common knowledge about respondents updating their belief in an impersonally informative 
manner, subjects being able to identify that truth-telling represents a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
and trusting others to play according to that Bayesian Nash equilibrium, too.9 Second, the scoring 
rules applied in Bayesian revelation mechanisms are complicated. This makes it hard to implement 
the mechanisms transparently by informing subjects about the exact scoring system. As a result of 
that, most empirical applications have relied on faith-based implementation, without explaining the 
actual scoring rules in detail, but by assuring participants that truth-telling would be optimal (e.g., 
Barrage and Lee, 2010; Howie et al., 2011; John et al., 2012; Prelec and Weaver, 2006; Shaw et 
al., 2011). 
 In this paper, we propose two tractable methods that intend to solve these problems: 
Benchmark and Coordination. Like Bayesian revelation mechanisms, both methods rely on the 
false consensus effect. While it is not possible to incentivize the elicitation of private information 
when there is no ground truth, it is feasible to incentive compatibly elicit a subject´s perception 
about others. Therefore, both mechanisms provide direct incentives for respondents to make 
statements that depend on their beliefs about the type of their peers. Following the idea of the false 
consensus effect, the elicited statements are then used to predict the respondent´s own type. The 
stronger the relationship between a subject´s type and her beliefs about others, the more effective 
the mechanisms are in revealing the subject´s private information. 
 In the first mechanism, Benchmark, a two-step approach is applied. First, a subject is asked 
about her private information in an non-incentivized manner. That statement is then used to serve 
as a benchmark for the elicitation of second-order beliefs (Perner and Wimmer, 1985) from another 
respondent, who has to guess the private information of the previously asked subject. The existence 
of a benchmark allows incentivization using ordinary scoring rules, such that the second respondent 
 
 9 Impersonal informativeness implies two aspects. First, a subject´s own type is informative, i.e., it provides evidence 
about population frequencies. Therefore, subjects expect over proportionally large shares of their own type among 
their peers. Second, this inference is impersonal, i.e., respondents of the same type draw identical inferences about the 
population, thereby arriving at identical posterior beliefs (Prelec, 2004). 
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is induced to engage in second-order reasoning in an effortful manner. The stronger the relationship 
between a subject´s own thought and second-order belief, the better of a proxy the elicited 
statement will be for her type. 
 In the second mechanism, Coordination, respondents are provided with a question and various 
answer alternatives. The subjects´ task is to coordinate on an answer, and each subject is paid based 
on the precision with which she anticipates the coordination outcome. The mechanism is inspired 
by the concept of focal points (Schelling, 1960), an approach to predict behavior in coordination 
settings with multiple equivalent equilibria. The concept postulates that participants in pure 
coordination settings exhibit shared perceptions about salient alternatives. Thereby, focal points 
emerge absent from payoffs and provide an implicit coordination device (Sudgen, 1995). Since the 
recognition of focal points requires subjects to form beliefs about the perception of saliences in 
other individuals, it involves higher-order reasoning (Camerer et al., 2004). Consequently, an 
individual´s coordination choice reflects her belief about the perception of others and, therefore, is 
informative about her own perception about the question at hand.10 
 The main advantage of the two methods is that they are tractable. The scoring and the payout 
function are easy to understand, such that participants are provided with a clear task that they have 
to solve. Therefore, the mechanisms are easy to implement for experimenters. By contrast to 
Bayesian revelation mechanisms, there is no theoretical necessity that subjects reveal their private 
information. However, it is reasonable to expect valid signals about the respondent´s thoughts. In 
section 4, we discuss how the mechanisms need to be implemented to maximize the discriminatory 
power of the two measures. 
 In an experiment, we mimic the elicitation of beliefs about unverifiable probabilities. 11 
Subjects are provided with instructions about an ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) conducted by 
Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014), and we elicit beliefs about proposer and responder behavior. 
 
 10 As we will show in section 3.2.2., the mechanism represents a generalization of the Krupka and Weber (2013) 
approach to identify social norms using coordination games. They propose to use coordination games to identify social 
norms on the aggregate level, while we argue that coordination games are suited to identify any kind of private 
information on the individual level. Indeed, there is evidence that individual coordination choices about social norm 
perception are related to a subject´s preferences. Schmidt (2019b) finds that injunctive and descriptive social norms 
elicited using coordination games predict revealed social preferences in a series of dictator games. 
 11 Belief about probabilities are an essential form of private information in the social sciences. For example, in 
psychology beliefs about probabilities are used to understand fear diseases (Slovic et al., 1980), in health sciences to 
understand risky health behaviors (Khwaja et al., 2006, 2009; Schoenbaum, 1997) and in economics to understand 
saving and investment behavior (Guiso et al., 1992, 1996). 
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Applying both a between-subject and a within-subject design, we elicit beliefs using the 
mechanisms Benchmark and Coordination as well as actual first-order beliefs by conditioning 
payments on factual probabilities. In the between-subject comparison, we find that both 
mechanisms accurately reveal mean first-order beliefs of the population. In the within-subject 
comparison, we find that the modal difference between probabilities elicited in either mechanism 
and actual beliefs is zero. We therefore conclude that, in the given setting, subjects strongly anchor 
their statements in Benchmark and Coordination on their first-order beliefs. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on methods 
to elicit private information. Section 3 explains Benchmark and Coordination, and also provides a 
theoretical background for each mechanism. Section 4 illustrates how the mechanisms need to be 
implemented to maximize the discriminatory power. In section 5, we present the experiment to test 
the mechanisms in the area of probabilistic beliefs, and in section 6 we formulate testable 
hypotheses. Section 7 presents the results. Section 8 discusses advantages and disadvantages 
compared to Bayesian revelation mechanisms. Section 9 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature 
The seminal contribution to eliciting unverifiable subjective information is Prelec (2004), who 
introduces a truth-inducing scoring system that includes two additive parts. First, an information 
report that refers to information privately owned by a respondent (her type). The information report 
is scored based on the degree to which it is surprisingly common in the population.12 Second, 
subjects make a prediction report. This report refers to the subject´s belief about the distribution of 
types in the population, and it is scored based on accuracy. Given a set of behavioral assumptions, 
such as common knowledge about a shared prior belief, impersonal informativeness, Bayesian 
reasoning and a sufficiently large sample of participants, truthfully reporting the own type 
represents a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
 
 12 The surprisingly common criterion exploits Bayesian reasoning, as subjects should and usually do make use of 
their own type, when predicting the prevalence of their own type in the population (Marks and Miller, 1987; Ross et 
al., 1977). Consequently, subjects anticipate that the actual prevalence of their own type is underestimated by their 
peers, which renders truthful reporting optimal regarding the surprisingly common principle. Rewarding answers that 
are more common than predicted avoids to bias a report in the direction of mainstream answers, since it equivalently 
rewards subjects with minority answers. 
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 Since Prelec´s (2004) innovation, various refinements have been proposed. Prelec and Seung 
(2006) demonstrate how to use the mechanism even when the majority of respondents are wrong. 
Witkowski and Parkes (2012a) propose the Robust Bayesian Truth Serum, which corrects Prelec´s 
(2004) drawback to operate properly only on large samples. In the Robust Bayesian Truth Serum, 
three subjects are sufficient to establish Bayesian Nash incentive-compatibility, but the mechanism 
is restricted to the elicitation of binary information. The modifications of Radanovic and Faltings 
(2013, 2014) allow the elicitation of non-binary signals, while still being incentive-compatible for 
small populations. Baillon (2017) proposes Bayesian markets, a method that simplifies previous 
mechanisms. Subjects make only one decision, namely whether or not to trade an asset whose value 
represents the share of affirmative answers to a question. Bayesian markets are thus more 
transparent and tractable for participants, but they are suited for binary questions only. 
 Our paper is also related to the peer prediction method (Miller et al., 2005), a scoring system 
that is based on the comparison of reports. Subjects state a report and are scored concerning the 
precision of their implied posterior belief about the report of another subject, such that truth-telling 
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Unlike the previously mentioned mechanisms, however, the peer 
prediction method makes the assumption that a common prior belief is not only shared by agents 
but also known to the mechanism. Witkowski and Parkes (2012b) propose a modification that 
allows to relax the common prior assumption. Jurca and Faltings (2006) show that paying a subject 
based on comparison with a sufficiently large number of agents minimizes the budget required for 
incentive compatibility. 
 Finally, our paper is related to Carvalho et al. (2017) who discuss mechanisms that are based 
on the assumption that respondents exhibit social projection, a strong form of the false consensus 
effect.13 They theoretically analyze payment structures that reward agreements and demonstrate 
that risk-neutral agents maximize their expected reward by honestly reporting their private 
information. In an online experiment involving text content-analysis, the subjects´ task is to review 
short texts under the criteria of grammar, clarity, and relevance. Their results support the hypothesis 
that agents report more accurate answers than when there are no incentives for honest reporting. 
 
 
 13 Social projection implies that subjects believe that their private answer equals the most popular answer of the 
remaining respondents. 
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3. Benchmark and Coordination 
Two methods are proposed to elicit private information in case of unverifiability: Benchmark and 
Coordination. In both methods, subjects are incentivized to make statements that depend on 
perceptions about private information of others. In section 3.1, we explain Benchmark, and in 
section 3.2, we explain Coordination. In both subsections, we provide theoretical backgrounds that 
illustrate why the methods are suited to predict a respondent´s type. 
 
3.1. Benchmark 
3.1.1. The Mechanism 
Benchmark consists of two steps and requires at least two subjects, a benchmarker, and a 
respondent. In step 1, the experimenter asks the benchmarker about some private information in a 
non-incentivized manner, and her answer is then considered the benchmark. In step 2, the 
respondent is asked to guess the answer of the benchmarker, and she receives a payment that 
depends on the accuracy of her second-order belief.14 Creating a benchmark in the first place 
circumvents the problem that scoring against an objective criterion is not feasible when an answer 
is unverifiable. Using the benchmark to condition the respondent´s guess allows the application of 
ordinary scoring rules, thereby inducing her to engage in second-order reasoning in an effortful 
manner. The closer the relationship between the respondent´s first-order and second-order belief, 
the better the prediction about her private information.  
 
3.1.2. Theoretical Background: The False Consensus Effect 
Benchmark capitalizes on the false consensus effect, a well-documented phenomenon that 
describes the tendency to perceive the own traits, such as preferences, habits, behaviors, choices, 
or opinions to be correlated with the corresponding traits of peers (Ross et al., 1977). As a result, 
subjects of a particular type expect over proportionally large shares of subjects similar to them in 
the population. Indeed, there is ample evidence that individuals overestimate the prevalence of their 
own characteristics (Bellemare et al., 2011; Bennett, 1999; Blanco et al., 2014; Charness and 
 
 14 We use the common definition that a subject´s first-order belief describes what she thinks about real events, while 
a second-order belief refers to what a subject believes about another subject´s thought (Perner and Wimmer, 1985). 
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Grosskopf, 2001; Marks and Miller, 1987; Mullen et al., 1985; Toussaert, 2018).15 Also, there is 
experimental evidence that the false consensus effect is surprisingly robust to information provision 
(e.g., Ambuehl et al., 2019; Engelman and Strobel, 2012). 
 The term false consensus effect accounts for the fact that subjects tend to overestimate the 
similarity between them and others. By now, however, the conclusion that consensus reasoning 
would be false per se has been put into perspective (Dawes, 1989, 1990; Engelman and Strobel, 
2012; Vanberg, 2019). Since the own type in fact constitutes a valid signal about the population, 
using that signal reflects a mere facet of Bayesian reasoning and is thus consistent with rational 
belief formation. Note that it is secondary for the argument made in Benchmark whether the false 
consensus effect is actually an artifact from rational belief formation or whether subjects put 
irrationally strong emphasis on the informational value steaming from their own type. It is simply 
necessary that the described relationship between a subject´s own type and her second-order belief 
does exist. Therefore, the stronger the degree of consensus reasoning inherent in a subject, the 
better of a proxy the elicited statement in Benchmark will be for her type. 
 
3.2. Coordination 
3.2.1. The Mechanism 
In Coordination, several subjects receive the same question, and they have to coordinate on the 
answer. Subjects are compensated based on their ability to anticipate the coordination outcome, 
which is determined as a function of all coordination choices. In case of verbal answers, this is 
usually the modal answer (e.g., Mehta et al., 1994a, 1994b; Krupka and Weber, 2013). In case of 
coordination with numbers, this could be the average, the median or the mode.16 The higher a 
subject´s accuracy in anticipating the coordination outcome, the higher her payment. 
 
 15 The false consensus effect is of particular interest for models of psychological game theory. Ellingsen et al. (2010) 
argue that correlation between behavior and second-order beliefs do not necessarily represent evidence for guilt 
aversion, but can partially be explained by false consensus. Bellemare et al. (2011) find that controlling for a consensus 
effect halves the extent of guilt aversion. Blanco et al. (2014) conclude that the false consensus effect explains 
correlation between first-mover and second-mover cooperation in a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. A more general 
analysis of the implications of false consensus on psychological game theory is done by Vanberg (2019). 
 16 For example, in Fehr et al. (2019), subjects have to coordinate by stating a number between 0 and 100. The smaller 
the distance between a respondent’s number and the average of all numbers, the higher her payment. 
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 Coordination is different from Benchmark in three aspects. First, by contrast to Benchmark, it 
does not require two steps since the elicitation of private information and the creation of the 
coordination outcome happen simultaneously. Second, while in Benchmark two subjects are 
needed to make the mechanism work, this is not necessarily the case in Coordination. Specifically, 
the mechanism requires that subjects perceive the coordination outcome to be exogenous, i.e., a 
single participant is not able to influence the coordination outcome.17 This requires that the number 
of participants is sufficiently large. Third, Benchmark and Coordination differ in the potential 
depth of reasoning required in the settings (Camerer et al., 2004; Nagel, 1995; Stahl and Wilson, 
1994, 1995;). Benchmark only requires the formation of second-order beliefs (beliefs about the 
thoughts of others). By contrast, coordination games are complex, and subjects might engage in 
the formation of even higher-order beliefs, in order to anticipate the coordination outcome in a 
more sophisticated manner. This, however, does not pose a threat to the proposed mechanism, as 
long as beliefs of higher-order depend on a subject´s first-order belief, i.e., her own thought about 
the question at hand. The mechanism Coordination thus relies on the assumption that a subject´s 
first-order belief tends to be correlated with beliefs of all orders (Dawes, 1989, 1990; Engelman 
and Strobel, 2012; Vanberg, 2019). 
 
3.2.2. Theoretical Background: Focal Points in Coordination Games 
Coordination capitalizes on the theory of focal points, a concept proposed by Schelling (1960) to 
understand behavior in pure coordination settings. Schelling (1960) argues that in pure 
coordination games with multiple equivalent equilibria, subjects perceive varying degrees of 
saliences of the available alternatives, and they assume that their perception is shared by the 
remaining participants (Sudgen, 1995). As a result, subjects use their own perception about salient 
choices to make predictions about how saliencies are perceived by other participants.18 This creates 
 
 17 This is relevant, because subjects shall reveal their best guess about the coordination outcome. If they were able to 
influence the outcome, they might engage in strategically affecting it. 
 18 Importantly, these saliences are assumed to be meaningful (to a researcher), i.e., they are induced by the question 
at hand. For example, in the original version of the Keynesian beauty contest (Keynes, 1936), respondents have to 
coordinate on the most attractive pictures of women. According to Schelling´s concept, such choices might reveal 
prevalent beauty ideals within the guessers´ population. 
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focal points that emerge absent from payoffs, thereby constituting an implicit coordination 
device.19 
 The proposition to infer private information from coordination choices is a generalization of 
the Krupka and Weber (2013) approach to use coordination games to identify social norms. In their 
mechanism, subjects are confronted with the description of a particular behavior, and their task is 
to coordinate on appropriateness ratings. Assuming that social norms reflect shared perceptions 
about appropriate behaviors (Crawford and Ostrom, 1995), focal points will be determined by 
social norm perception of subjects. As a result, the coordination outcome indicates the perception 
of social norms within the players´ population. In their experiment, Krupka and Weber (2013) find 
that social norms elicited using coordination games predict behavior shifts across different version 
of the dictator game. While Krupka and Weber (2013) conclude that coordination games are suited 
to identify social norms on the aggregate level, we argue that their approach is suited to extract 
any kind of private information on the individual level. 
 
4. Maximizing Discriminatory Power in Benchmark and Coordination 
4.1. Discriminatory Power 
We argue that, based on the phenomenon of false consensus, a subject´s choice in Coordination 
and Benchmark yields an informative signal about the respondent´s type. In order to maximize the 
informativeness stemming from the two mechanisms, the task should be constructed such that 
subjects which are of different types respond to the task in different ways. In test theory, this feature 
is referred to as discriminatory power and it has been extensively studied in that domain (e.g., 
Birnbaum et al., 1968; Ferrando, 2012; Hankins, 2007; Loevinger, 1954). Discriminatory power 
measures the degree to which a test score varies with the level of the measured trait and thus reflects 
the effectiveness of a test detect differences between participants concerning the respective trait.20 
To illustrate this, imagine a test that is either extremely easy or extremely hard. In both cases, the 
 
 19 Since Schelling (1960), both experimental and theoretical work has corroborated the relevance of focal points in a 
variety of coordination settings, e.g., Binmore and Samuelson, 2006; Casajus, 2000; Crawford et al., 2008; Fehr et al., 
2019; Isoni et al., 2013, 2014, 2019; Janssen, 2001, 2006; Metha et al. 1992, 1994a, 1994b; Pope et al., 2015; Sudgen, 
1995; Sugden and Zamarrón, 2006. Schmidt (2019a) proposes how to measure the distribution of focal points on the 
individual level. 
 20 Therefore, in addition to validity and reliability, discriminatory power is an important feature of the design of tests 
(Lumsden, 1976). 
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variance will be low, as the average performance will be either close to the minimum or close to 
the maximum number of points. To render the distribution of scores informative, the test shall be 
likely to yield higher scores for more capable subjects and lower scores for less capable subjects. 
That is, the test shall yield variable results, given that the test-takers are indeed different. Therefore, 
the difficulty of the test needs to be calibrated such that average performances correspond to an 
expected number of solved tasks lying in the middle of the total number of items. If the difficulty 
of the task is appropriate, it becomes likely that heterogenous test-takers receive varying scores. 
 We argue that this design feature is also crucial when applying Benchmark and Coordination. 
In particular, we claim that inducing variability in the respondents´ answers is generally feasible, 
such that a subject´s choice is related to her type in a meaningful manner. If that holds, then the 
direction in which the answer of a subject differs from the answer of another subject is informative 
about the difference between the underlying types of the two recipients. 
 
4.2. Example: Eliciting Minority Opinions using Numerical Questions 
We illustrate this with the elicitation of minority opinions. Assume that an experimenter wants to 
elicit beliefs about the probability that, in a sports match, Team A wins against Team B. The 
experimenter is aware that it is common knowledge among recipients that Team A is significantly 
weaker than Team B. Let us assume that the participants have diverging opinions about the 
probability that Team A wins, but the median first-order belief about the probability that Team A 
wins is 10%. If the experimenter asks whether Team A or Team B would win, then there would 
not be variation, since no participant in Benchmark or Coordination would think that Team A is a 
promising bet in that setting. However, if the experimenter had a reliable prior about the distribution 
of first-order beliefs, she could calibrate the question accordingly, for example by asking whether 
or not the probability that Team A wins is smaller or larger than 10%. If the experimenter’s prior 
is accurate, the rephrased question can be expected to induce variability in answers, which would 
allow to draw discriminatory inferences about the subjects´ types. 
 That approach, however, requires the experimenter to have a reliable prior about the 
distribution of first-order beliefs in the population. Another possibility is to provide subjects with 
numerical answers in a more nuanced way. In the above-described example, the experimenter could 
have subjects state percentage points for the probability that Team A wins. In the case of 
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Benchmark, the experimenter would first elicit the first-order belief of the benchmarker, who states 
an integer between 0 and 100 that shall represent the probability in percent that the event occurs. 
The respondent is then asked to guess the integer stated by the benchmarker and is then paid based 
on the accuracy of her second-order belief. Equivalently, in Coordination subjects could coordinate 
on an integer between 0 and 100. The coordination outcome is determined as a function of the 
coordination choices, e.g., the mean, the median, or the mode. Each participant is then paid based 
on the distance between her coordination choice and the coordination outcome.21 The significant 
advantage of using numerical scales is that, by design, it is likely to receive variation in the 
respondents´ answers, since many numbers are a potentially promising bet in the settings of 
Benchmark and Coordination. 
 
5. Experimental Design and Procedure 
We mimic the elicitation of unverifiable beliefs and examine whether the proposed mechanisms 
are suited to reveal subjects´ first-order beliefs.22 The participants´ task is to estimate empirical 
probabilities of events in an ultimatum game conducted by Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014), 
hereafter TK.23 At the beginning of our experiment, subjects learn that it is their task to estimate 
probabilities about behavior in an ultimatum game that has already been conducted. For that sake, 
subjects receive detailed information about TK´s ultimatum game. They are then instructed about 
their tasks in the respective treatments and the scoring mechanisms. In section 5.1, we elaborate on 
the rules of TK´s ultimatum game. In section 5.2, we present the design of our treatments and in 
section 5.3 the procedure of our experiment. 
 
 
 21 One potential threat for coordination with numbers results from artefactual focal points, i.e., focal numbers within 
the set of feasible choices (these could be numbers such as 0, 1, 10, 50 or 100). This, however, is not a problem, when 
other signals that induce focality, are more prominent. In an experimental setting similar to ours, Fehr et al. (2019) 
examine whether “sunspots”, i.e., external signal about the true state of the world, affect coordination choices, when 
subjects coordinate on integers between 0 and 100. They find that, when external signals are available, the relevance 
of artefact focal points diminishes. 
 22 By mimicking the elicitation of unverifiable beliefs, we intend to simulate a situation that is equivalent to the 
measurement of beliefs about unverifiable events. This requires the assumption that subjects are unaware of the factual 
probabilities that they have to assess. 
 23 The experiment of TK consisted of two stages. In stage 1, subjects play the ultimatum game. In stage 2, the authors 
elicit beliefs from participants using different scoring rules. As subject are paid randomly either for stage 1 (ultimatum 
game) or stage 2 (belief elicitation), there is no reason to assume that the stages affect each other. Therefore, in our 
study, we do not mention stage 2 of TK, but only explain the rules of the ultimatum game in stage 1. 
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5.1. The Ultimatum Game of Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (2014) 
In TK´s ultimatum game, the proposer could choose between six alternatives that determined how 
a fixed pie of 20€ would be divided between herself and a responder. Responders had to indicate 
via strategy method (Selten, 1967) for each of the possible allocations, whether they would accept 
that allocation, or not. After every subject took the respective decision, the computer randomly 
matched proposers and recipients. If the responder indicated acceptance for the proposed allocation, 
the respective allocation was implemented. If the responder indicated rejection, both subjects 
received nothing. 
 We pay significant attention to make sure that subjects understand the rules of TK´s ultimatum 
game and to make clear that it is not their task to play the game themselves but to assess observed 
behavior rates of others in that game. Subjects are provided with the original wording of TK´s 
instructions and answer a series of comprehension questions.24 Also, participants in our experiment 
receive information about the general setting of TK´s experimental procedure (computerized 
laboratory experiment, show-up fee of 5€, random assignment of roles, anonymous interaction, 
etc.). Table 1 shows the available allocations as well as empirical probabilities of proposer choices 
and responder acceptance rates in TK. 
 
Table 1. Ultimatum Game of Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2014) 
 Available Allocations in the Ultimatum Game 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Proposer Payoff 20€ 16€ 12€ 8€ 4€ 0€ 
Responder Payoff 0€ 4€ 8€ 12€ 16€ 20€ 
 Proposer behavior (n = 103) 
Choice Probability 6% 20% 66% 7% 2% 0% 
 Responder behavior (n = 103) 
Acceptance Probability 14% 43% 90% 95% 92% 88% 
 
 
 
 
 24 Subjects are also explicitly told, that these instructions correspond to the original wording used by TK. 
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5.2. Treatments and Scoring 
Treatments. Four main treatments are conducted: SURVEY, BELIEF, BENCHMARK, and 
COORDINATION. Additionally, we conduct CONTROL, a control treatment that is intended to 
capture the degree of noise inherent in the elicitation of beliefs in the given setting. Subjects are 
instructed about the task in the respective treatment, i.e., whether their task is to state first-order 
beliefs, second-order beliefs, or whether their task is to coordinate. Probabilities are separately 
elicited for the 12 possible events in TK´s ultimatum game. Precisely, subjects state for each of the 
six possible allocations (i) how probable it was that a proposer chose a particular allocation and (ii) 
how probable it was that a responder accepted a particular allocation. Our design is intended to 
compare first-order beliefs, second-order beliefs, and coordination choices both in a between 
subject-manner and in a within-subject manner (see table 2). 
 • SURVEY: In treatment SURVEY, first-order beliefs are elicited in an non-incentivized 
manner. Subjects asses the probabilities of the 12 events of TK´s ultimatum game and receive a 
fixed payment of 12.50€ for their participation in the experiment. Treatment SURVEY is intended 
to yield non-incentivized beliefs that are then used to score second-order beliefs elicited in 
BENCHMARK.25 
 • BELIEF: In treatment BELIEF, first-order beliefs are elicited in an incentivized manner. 
Subjects are instructed that their payment depends on the precision of their first-order beliefs about 
the factual probabilities in TK. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly draws one 
item, and the performance in that item determines a respondent´s payoff. 
 • BENCHMARK: BENCHMARK consists of two independent parts. In the first part, subjects 
are instructed, that their task is to assess how other respondents previously estimated the results of 
TK. Also, subjects are informed that their payment depends on the accuracy of their second-order 
beliefs about the previously elicited estimations of the other respondents. In the second part, 
subjects have to state their first-order beliefs and are scored as in treatment BELIEF, i.e., based on 
objective accuracy. One randomly drawn item of the two stages determines the payment. 
 
 25 Note that, for the purpose of using the results from that treatment for BENCHMARK, the number of participants is 
irrelevant, since the number of participants in a treatment does not affect the expected outcome, as long as subjects are 
drawn from the same population. 
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 • COORDINATION: COORDINATION consists of two independent parts. In the first part, 
subjects are instructed that their payment is based on the ability to anticipate the coordination 
outcome. The coordination outcome is the average number stated by the participants in a session. 
That is, the closer their stated probability is to the coordination outcome, the higher their payment. 
In the second part, subjects have to state their first-order beliefs, as is in BELIEF. One randomly 
drawn item of the two stages determines the payment. 
 • CONTROL: Treatment CONTROL is identical to BELIEF except that the treatment consists 
of two stages, both of which elicit first-order beliefs. That treatment serves as a control condition 
for the treatments BENCHMARK and COORDINATION, in order to identify the degree of noise 
that is inherent in the elicitation of beliefs in the given setting. 
 Scoring. In each treatment (except SURVEY) subjects are paid based on accuracy regarding 
the respective task, and performance is evaluated relative to the other subjects within a session. 
Subjects within a session are ranked from highest to lowest accuracy regarding the respective task. 
In BELIEF, subjects are ranked according to the accuracy of their first-order belief in one randomly 
drawn item. In BENCHMARK, subjects are ranked according to the accuracy of their second-order 
belief. In COORDINATION, subjects are ranked according to their ability to anticipate the 
coordination outcome. The subject with the highest accuracy earns 15€. Payment then linearly 
diminishes by 0.75€ by each rank. That is, the subject with the second-highest performance earns 
14.25€, the subject with the third-highest performance earns 13.50€, and so forth.26 Since all 
sessions were conducted with 20 participants, the incentives created through the relative payment 
scheme are identical. In addition to that payment, subjects receive a show-up fee of 5€. By contrast 
to these treatments, in treatment SURVEY, subjects receive a show-up fee of 12.50€.27 
 After instructing subjects about their specific task and the scoring mechanisms, they answer a 
series of control questions. This way, we make sure that they understand their task, and how their 
compensation would be determined in the respective treatments. Table 2 summarizes the structure 
 
 26 We opted for this payment scheme for the sake of simplicity for participants. In the experiment, subjects are handed 
a sheet of paper showing which relative rank yields which payoff. Another advantage of the relative scoring regime 
we apply is that the incentives for accuracy are high. By contrast, in static scoring rules incentives for being accurate 
are limited. In the quadratic scoring rule, for example, moderate inaccuracies have only relatively small effects on the 
respondent´s payoff, while the subject´s payoff diminishes exponentially when the degree of inaccuracy becomes large. 
 27 In expectancy, the payment between the five treatments is (almost) identical. The expected payoff in the treatments 
with relative payments is 12.88€. 
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of treatments and illustrates the between-subject and the within-subject comparisons that the 
experiment allows. 
 
Table 2. Treatment Overview and Content 
 n Stage 1 Stage 2 
Survey 20 First-order belief (non-incentivized) - 
Belief 60 First-order belief - 
Benchmark 60 Second-order belief First-order belief 
Coordination 60 Coordination First-order belief 
Control 40 First-order belief First-order belief 
 
5.3. Procedure 
The computerized experiment (z-Tree; Fischbacher, 2007) was conducted at the experimental 
laboratory of Heidelberg University (Germany). 240 participants were recruited from the general 
student population via hroot (Bock et al., 2012) and participated in 12 experimental sessions 
between January and June 2019. Mean age was 23.4 years, 53.8% were female, and 30.4% had an 
economics background in their studies. Pairwise Mann-Whitney-U tests indicate that the 
composition of participants´ gender, age, and field of study does not differ between treatments. A 
typical session lasted about 45 minutes, and subjects earned on average about €12.80 including a 
show-up fee of €5. 
 
6. Hypotheses 
A simple model of second-order beliefs in Benchmark and coordination choices in Coordination is 
set up to formulate testable hypotheses. Denote subjects as 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛 and events as 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚. 
Subject 𝑖´s first-order belief about the probability that event 𝑗 materializes is 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗. Second-order 
beliefs elicited in Benchmark are denoted as 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 and coordination choices elicited in Coordination 
as 𝐶𝑖𝑗. All statements 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗, 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 are expressed as integers between 0 and 100, representing 
the probability in percent that an event materializes. Accordingly, average first-order beliefs of the 
population about the probability that event 𝑗  materializes are 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = (∑ 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛 , average 
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second-order beliefs are 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = (∑ 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗)/𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1  and average coordination choices are 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ =
(∑ 𝐶𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. 
 We model second-order beliefs and coordination choices as a function of first-order beliefs: 
𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵  and 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶 . The error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵  and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  capture the difference 
between a respondent´s statement in the respective mechanism and her actual first-order belief. 
One way to interpret these error terms is that they result from an anchoring and adjustment 
procedure (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974). 28  That is, subjects anchor their statements in 
Benchmark and Coordination on their first-order belief, and they then adjust it deepening on their 
perception about the coherence between their own perception and their best guess about the 
perception of others (Epley et al., 2004). 29  Accordingly, averages of the population can be 
formulated as 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜀𝑗
𝑆𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅ and 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ + 𝜀𝑗
𝐶̅̅ ̅.30 The model illustrates when the mechanisms 
Benchmark and Coordination work best, namely when 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵  and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  are small. The following 
hypotheses formulate how 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  as well as 𝜀𝑗
𝑆𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅ and 𝜀𝑗
𝐶̅̅ ̅ look like. 
 Hypothesis 1A refers to average second-order beliefs 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ made in Benchmark and Hypothesis 
1B refers to average coordination choices 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ made in Coordination. We hypothesize that the 
average statements made in the two mechanisms about a particular event 𝑗 do not differ from 
average first-order beliefs 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ elicited in Belief. This implies that 𝜀𝑗
𝑆𝐵̅̅ ̅̅̅ and 𝜀𝑗
𝐶̅̅ ̅ do not differ from 
zero. 
Hypothesis 1A. Average second-order beliefs about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ from 
average first-order beliefs: 𝑆𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
Hypothesis 1B. Average coordination choices about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ from 
average first-order beliefs: 𝐶𝑗̅̅ ̅ = 𝐹𝐵𝑗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. 
 
 28 The “anchoring and adjustment heuristic” describes the strategy to make judgments under uncertainty by anchoring 
on information that comes to mind and adjust it until a plausible estimate is reached. 
 29 Epley et al. (2004) propose to model perspective taking as an anchoring and adjustment procedure. People derive 
beliefs about others by initially anchoring their beliefs in an egocentric manner, and subsequently accounting for 
potential differences between themselves and others. In a series of experiments, the authors find evidence for this 
hypothesis. 
 30 Note that the model is intended to be simple and yield tractable hypotheses, therefore it is not the aim to model 
what kind of processes shape error terms. 
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 Hypothesis 2A refers to individual second-order beliefs 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗  elicited in Benchmark and 
Hypothesis 2B refers to individual coordination choices 𝐶𝑖𝑗  elicited in Coordination. We 
hypothesize that the individual statements made in the two mechanisms about a particular event 𝑗 
do not differ from individual first-order beliefs 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 elicited in Belief. This implies that 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  
do not differ from zero. 
Hypothesis 2A. Individual second-order beliefs about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ from 
individual first-order beliefs: 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗. 
Hypothesis 2B. Individual coordination choices about the probability of event 𝑗 do not differ from 
individual first-order beliefs: 𝐶𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗. 
 
7. Results 
7.1. Between-Subject Analysis of Averages 
We start with aggregate level analysis by comparing average first-order beliefs with (i) average 
second-order beliefs and (ii) average coordination choices. Figure 1 shows average first-order 
beliefs elicited in BELIEF, average second-order beliefs elicited in stage 1 of BENCHMARK, and 
average coordination choices elicited in stage 1 of COORDINATION. Items C1 to C6 refer to 
probabilities of proposers-choices and A1 to A6 refer to acceptance-rates of responders. Mann-
Whitney-U tests are conducted to test for equality of averages. Before correcting for multiple 
testing, item C6 differs between BENCHMARK and BELIEF (p < 0.05) and the same item differs 
between COORDINATION and BELIEF (p < 0.01).31 Both significances vanish when correcting 
for multiple testing using the Bonferroni procedure.32 We therefore cannot reject hypotheses 1A 
and 1B, which state that the average probabilities elicited in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION 
are identical to average first-order beliefs elicited in BELIEF. 
 
 31 In Appendix A.2, the reader finds a graph with the results from treatment SURVEY. Graphical analysis suggests 
that non-incentivized beliefs elicited in SURVEY tend to differ from incentivized beliefs elicited in BELIEF. This is 
not implausible, given the lack of incentivization to carefully read the instructions and exert effortful thinking in that 
treatment, since subjects were informed about their fixed compensation at the beginning of the experiment. Note, 
however, that our study is not intended to test whether non-incentivized elicitation differs from incentivized elicitation 
of beliefs. 
 32 We account for the fact that multiple items are used to detect treatment differences. In order to take care of the 
inflation of the overall type-I-error rate, we therefore multiply the p-values by the number of items (i.e., by twelve). 
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Result 1. In a between-subject analysis, average second-order beliefs and average coordination 
choices do not differ from average first-order beliefs. 
 
Figure 1. Between-Subject Comparison of Elicited Probabilities 
 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice behavior of proposers and A1-A6 
refer to probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. The numbers in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION 
are elicited in the first stage of the treatments, i.e., using the respective mechanisms. 
 
7.2. Within-Subject Analysis of Averages 
To examine differences in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION to first-order beliefs on the 
individual level, we start by comparing average outcomes between stage 1 and stage 2 in these 
treatments. Remember that in stage 1, the respective mechanisms are applied, i.e., subjects state 
their second-beliefs in stage 1 of BENCHMARK, and they coordinate in stage 1 of 
COORDINATION. In stage 2, first-order beliefs are elicited in the same manner as in BELIEF. By 
contrast to the above section, we now compare the outcomes of the mechanisms with first-order 
beliefs in a within-subject manner. Panel A of Figure 2 compares averages of stage 1 and stage 2 
in BENCHMARK, and Panel B compares averages of stage 1 and stage 2 in COORDINATION. 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests are conducted to detect differences between averages. Before 
correcting for multiple testing, item C1 (p < 0.1) and item C4 (p < 0.05) differs between stage 1 
and stage 2 in BENCHMARK. In COORDINATION, item C2 (p < 0.05), item A1 (p < 0.05) and 
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item A4 (p < 0.1) differ between stage 1 and stage 2. Again, these significances vanish after the 
correction procedure. The results are thus consistent with those reported in the previous section, 
i.e., average second-order beliefs elicited in BENCHMARK and average coordination choices 
elicited in COORDINATION do not differ from average first-order beliefs of subjects. 
Result 2. In a within-subject analysis, average second-order beliefs and average coordination 
choices do not differ from average first-order beliefs. 
 
Figure 2. Within-Subject Comparison of Elicited Probabilities 
Panel A. Benchmark Panel B. Coordination 
  
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice behavior of proposers and A1-A6 refer to 
probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. The straight line in Panel A indicates average second-order beliefs 
elicited in stage 1 of BENCHMARK and the straight line in Panel B indicates average coordination choices elicited in stage 
1 of COORDINATION. The dashed lines in both panels indicate average first-order beliefs elicited in stage 2 from the same 
participants. 
  
7.3. Correlations 
We now analyze to what degree probability statements elicited in BENCHMARK and 
COORDINATION are related to first-order beliefs of individuals by conducting correlation 
analyses. Looking at the combined data of all items, we find that the statements in stage 1 and stage 
2 are strongly and statistically significantly correlated in both treatments (r = 0.87 in BENCHMARK; 
0
20
40
60
80
100
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
S
ta
te
d
 P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 i
n
 P
er
ce
n
t
Second-Order Belief (stage 1)
First-Order Belief (stage 2)
0
20
40
60
80
100
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
S
ta
te
d
 P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
 i
n
 P
er
ce
n
t
Coordination Choice (stage 1)
First-Order Belief (stage 2)
20 
 
r = 0.90 in COORDINATION; p < 0.00001 in both treatments; Pearson correlation).33 That result 
is consistent with the idea promoted in section 4, i.e., that the statements extracted in BENCHMARK 
and COORDINATION vary with the underlying first-order belief of individuals. Likewise, the 
correlation between stage 1 and stage 2 is strongly positive and statistically significant in treatment 
CONTROL (r = 0.89; p < 0.00001; Pearson correlation), but the correlation is not higher than in 
BENCHMARK and COORDINATION. 
Result 3. Second-order beliefs, as well as coordination choices, are significantly positively 
correlated with first-order beliefs. 
 
7.4. Analysis of Error Terms 
We proceed by analyzing the congruence between numbers stated in stage 1 and stage 2 of 
BENCHMARK and COORDINATION. For that sake, we examine the distribution of error terms 
𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 and 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶  defined in section 6, which emerge when a subject states different numbers in stage 1 
and stage 2 for the same item.34 It is reasonable to expect that subjects will exhibit noise when 
stating their beliefs for 12 items two times in a row. To have a baseline to compare the distribution 
of error terms with, we use the error terms observed in treatment CONTROL, which provide a 
measure for the degree of noise that occurs when subjects state first-order beliefs. 
 In order to get an impression about that measure, Figure 3 shows the distribution of individual 
error terms based on the combined data of all items.35 The distribution is centered around zero, and 
the modal error term, as well as the median error term in each treatment, equal zero (see Table 3). 
Two-sided t-tests are conducted to test if mean error terms on the item level differ from zero.36 We 
do not find that error terms in any item differ from zero, neither in BENCHMARK nor 
COORDINATION.37 The fact that error terms do not differ from zero is consistent with Hypotheses 
1A and 1B. 
 
 33 The correlation coefficients are based on 720 observations in BENCHMARK, 720 observations COORDINATION 
and 480 observations in CONTROL. Conducting correlation analyses separated by items also yields strongly positive 
and significant correlations. 
 34 In BENCHMARK, error terms are defined as the difference between a subject´s second-order belief and first-order 
belief: 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵 = 𝑆𝐵𝑖𝑗 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 . In COORDINATION, error terms are defined as the difference between a subject´s 
coordination choice and first-order belief: 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶 = 𝐶𝑖𝑗 − 𝐹𝐵𝑖𝑗 . 
 35 The number of data points per treatment equals the number of participants multiplied by the number of items. 
 36 In Appendix A.1, Table 5, Panel A, we report mean error terms on the item level.  
 37 Likewise, error terms in CONTROL do not differ from zero. 
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 To investigate Hypotheses 2A and 2B, we analyze means of absolute error terms: |𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑆𝐵| and 
|𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝐶 |.38 Two-sided t-tests are conducted to test if mean absolute error terms on the item level differ 
from zero.39 We find that in all three treatments, in most items mean absolute error terms are 
significantly different from zero on the 5%-level.40 After the correction procedure, still, most items 
remain significantly different from zero on the 5%-level. This result is not consistent with 
Hypotheses 2A and 2B. In order to identify what part of these differences is due to noise, we 
compare mean absolute error terms in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION with mean absolute 
error terms observed in treatment CONTROL. Conducting Mann-Whitney-U tests to identify 
differences between treatments, we do not find that BENCHMARK or COORDINATION differs 
from CONTROL in terms of absolute error terms. 
Result 4. Mean error terms do not differ from zero in either treatment. 
Result 5. Mean absolute error terms significantly differ from zero in each treatment. However, 
mean absolute error terms observed in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION do not differ from 
mean absolute error terms in CONTROL. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 Absolute error terms |𝜀𝑗| are the absolute values of error terms 𝜀𝑗. The average absolute error term |𝜀𝑗|̅̅ ̅̅ of item 𝑗 is 
calculated as |𝜀𝑗|̅̅ ̅̅ = (∑ |𝜀𝑖𝑗| 
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. 
 39 In Appendix A.1, Table 5, Panel B, we report mean absolute error terms on the item level.  
 40 Precisely, in BENCHMARK and CONTROL, in 11 of the 12 items mean absolute error terms differ from zero with 
p < 0.05; in COORDINATION, in 10 items mean absolute error terms differ from zero with p < 0.05 (see Appendix 
A.1). 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Individual Error Terms (all Items) 
 
Notes: Error terms are percentage points stated in stage 1, minus the percentage points stated in stage 2 for identical 
items. The graph indicates the relative frequency of each possible value of error terms. The data of the graph comprises 
all 12 items of treatments. 
 
Table 3. Error Terms and Absolute Error Terms (all Items) 
 Error Terms 𝜺𝒊𝒋 Absolute Error Terms |𝜺𝒊𝒋| 
 Mode Median Mean Mode Median Mean 
Benchmark (n = 720) 0 0 0.25 0 2 9.57 
Coordination (n = 720) 0 0 -0.86 0 3 9.03 
Control (n = 480) 0 0 -2.21 0 2 8.45 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. The data of the table comprises all 12 items of treatments. In Appendix A.1, 
we report mean error terms and mean absolute error terms on the item level. 
 
7.5. External Validity 
Figure 4 (Appendix A.1) indicates a high external validity of all mechanisms, as subjects are 
accurately assessing the patterns of proposer choices and responder acceptance rates in each 
treatment. To evaluate external validity, mean Brier scores (Brier, 1950), i.e., average squared 
deviations between factual data and elicited beliefs, are calculated and reported in Table 4. Before 
the correction procedure, Brier scores of item C6 differ between BENCHMARK and BELIEF (p < 
0.05), and the same item differs between COORDINATION and BELIEF (p < 0.01). None of these 
differences survive the correction procedure. That is, external validity in BENCHMARK and 
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COORDINATION does not differ from the degree of external validity that is obtained when first-
order beliefs are elicited in an ordinary manner. 
 
Table 4. Mean Brier Scores 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Belief 0,05 0,06 0,04 0,06 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,10 0,12 0,05 0,05 0,06 
Benchmark 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,10 0,02 0,02* 0,03 0,08 0,08 0,05 0,04 0,06 
Coordination 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,09 0,02 0,01** 0,02 0,09 0,10 0,04 0,05 0,04 
Notes: The table contains mean Brier scores. Items C1-C6 refer to choice-probabilities of proposers and items A1-
A6 refer to acceptance-probabilities of responders. Lower scores represent higher levels of accuracy. *, ** indicates 
significance at the 5%, and 1% level compared to the respective score in treatment BELIEF. 
 
7.6. Discussion of Results and Evaluation of Hypotheses 
We cannot reject the hypotheses 1A and 1B that the average outcomes in Benchmark and 
Coordination correspond to average first-order beliefs. This result holds both in a between-subject 
analysis and in a within-subject analysis. In accordance, mean error terms do not differ from zero 
in either treatment. The gathered evidence therefore supports the idea that both methods are 
effective in revealing mean beliefs on the population level. The correspondence of averages 
between mean second-order beliefs elicited in BENCHMARK and coordination choices elicited in 
COORDINATION implies that the mechanisms yield an unbiased measure about a subject´s first-
order belief. Still, when comparing individual choices made BENCHMARK and COORDINATION 
with first-order beliefs on the individual level (i.e., mean absolute error terms), we find them to be 
significantly larger than zero. 
 However, two considerations put the results on absolute error terms into perspective. First, the 
mean of absolute error terms is significantly larger than the median of absolute error terms in both 
treatments (see Table 3). Almost half of the estimations extracted in BENCHMARK and 
COORDINATION are identical with first-order beliefs, and also the median differences indicate 
negligible deviations between statements extracted in the two mechanisms and actual first-order 
beliefs. In the given setting, the median difference is more informative, since the mean is strongly 
affected by few subjects that enter strongly diverging numbers in the two stages (thereby strongly 
increasing the mean of absolute error terms). Second, as seen in treatment CONTROL, the degree 
of noise inherent in the setting equals the extent of error terms in BENCHMARK and 
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COORDINATION. The deviations on the individual level thus seem to be driven by subjects being 
ambiguous about their actual first-order belief, thus creating noise. 
 Altogether, the observed differences between stage 1 and stage 2 in BENCHMARK and 
COORDINATION are not distinguishable from treatment CONTROL. Also, the correlation in 
CONTROL between the two stages is not higher than in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION. We 
therefore cannot reject hypotheses 2A and 2B that the statements extracted in the two mechanisms 
correspond to first-order beliefs on the individual level. 
 
8. Advantages Compared to Bayesian Revelation Mechanisms 
Compared to Bayesian Revelation Mechanism, we see three main advantages of Benchmark and 
Coordination. First, they require fewer behavioral assumptions. Precisely, it is sufficient to assume 
that a subject´s perceptions about others are correlated with her own type. Second, the scoring 
systems of both mechanisms are less complicated. This makes it easier for participants to 
understand the scoring system and, therefore, it simplifies a tractable and transparent 
implementation for experimenters. Third, it is easier for subjects to understand their “challenge” in 
the game, i.e., to comprehend the task necessary to maximize earnings. Subjects learn that their 
specific challenge is to foresee a particular outcome (either a statement by another person or a 
coordination outcome). Therefore, respondents know that their payment is conditioned on that 
particular value and that their payments monotonically increase with the precision of their guess 
about that specific value. This makes the task tangible for respondents. 
 By contrast, in empirical applications of Bayesian revelation mechanisms, subjects often do 
not learn how the calculation of their score, and thus their payoff, exactly look like. If subjects lack 
comprehension of the underlying mechanisms, it is plausible that subjects deviate from their true 
thought if they believe that they might “know better” how the profit-maximizing statement looks 
like. This might lead subjects to engage in an attempt to game the mechanism, which is problematic 
because it is not observable by the experimenter and thus cannot be controlled for. Likewise, even 
if participants fully understand the mechanisms and are aware of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
inherent in the setting, it is unclear whether they trust in other subjects to play Bayesian Nash, too. 
Obviously, it is rational to play according to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium only if one is confident 
that the remaining players also play according to that concept. Therefore, as in weakest-link games, 
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lack of trust regarding Bayesian Nash play of other subjects might refrain a subject from playing 
Bayesian Nash herself (Knez and Camerer, 1994). 
 One further advantage is that the mechanisms, especially Benchmark, might be suited to elicit 
questions about shameful traits. In Bayesian Revelation Mechanisms, subjects are usually directly 
asked about their own type. Therefore, submitting shameful answers comes at a cost when 
admitting one´s own (shameful) type, either to oneself or to the experimenter. By contrast, this is 
avoided, when subjects are asked about potentially shameful traits of others (as is done in 
Benchmark). 
 The fact that the proposed methods are more tractable and transparent comes at the cost that 
truth-telling is not a theoretical necessity. By contrast, this is the case in Bayesian revelation 
mechanisms, given that all assumptions hold. Therefore, the proposed mechanisms yield 
potentially less accurate information if the subjects´ behavior in Bayesian revelation mechanisms 
adheres to all assumptions, or if for other reasons, subjects believe that truth-telling is the profit-
maximizing choice in a Bayesian revelation mechanism. 
 
9. Summary and Conclusion 
We propose two tractable methods to incentivize the elicitation of unverifiable private information: 
Benchmark and Coordination. In both mechanisms, participants are incentivized to reveal their 
perception about others, and these statements are then used to predict the subjects´ own thoughts. 
The stronger the relationship between a subject´s type and her perception about others, the more 
effective the mechanisms are in revealing the subject´s private information.  
 The main advantage of the two methods is that scoring and payout functions are simple to 
understand, such that participants are provided with a clear task that they have to solve. This makes 
the mechanisms easy to implement for experimenters. The methods thus provide simple 
alternatives to Bayesian revelation mechanisms, when an experimenter is interested in eliciting 
non-verifiable, private information from subjects. 
 In an experiment, we mimic the elicitation of beliefs about unverifiable probabilities. In a 
between-subject comparison, we find that both mechanisms accurately reveal mean first-order 
beliefs of the population. In a within-subject comparison, we find that the modal difference between 
probabilities elicited in either mechanism and actual beliefs is zero. We therefore conclude that 
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subjects strongly anchor their statements in Benchmark and Coordination on their first-order 
beliefs. 
 The paper also contributes to the literature on the elicitation of social norms using coordination 
games, initiated by Krupka and Weber (2013). Our results suggest that the two methods Benchmark 
and Coordination yield identical results, which indicates that incentivized elicitation of social 
norms using coordination games is also feasible through the elicitation of second-order beliefs. As 
a result, it allows eliciting such data without the necessity to establish an infrastructure for 
coordination. This simplifies data collection in contexts other than laboratory experiments, for 
example in (online) polls with laypeople, while still maintaining the feature of incentivization. 
 
Appendix 
A.1. Error Terms and Absolute Error Terms on the Item Level 
A.1.1. Mean Error Terms 
Panel A of Table 5 shows means of error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑗 on the item level. The average error term 𝜀?̅? of 
item 𝑗 is calculated as 𝜀?̅? = (∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. Two-sided t-tests are conducted to test if mean error terms 
on the item level differ from zero. We do not find that error terms in any item differs from zero 
neither in BENCHMARK or COORDINATION nor in CONTROL. 
 
A.1.2. Mean Absolute Error Terms 
Panel B of Table 5 shows means of absolute error terms |𝜀𝑖𝑗| on the item level. The average absolute 
error term |𝜀𝑗|
̅̅ ̅̅̅of item 𝑗 is calculated as |𝜀𝑗|
̅̅ ̅̅̅ = (∑ |𝜀𝑖𝑗| 
𝑛
𝑖=1 )/𝑛. Two-sided t-tests are conducted to test 
if mean absolute error terms on the item level differ from zero. We find that in all three treatments, 
in most items mean absolute error terms are significantly different from zero on the 5%-level. 
Precisely, in BENCHMARK and CONTROL, in 11 of the 12 items mean absolute error terms differ 
from zero with p < 0.05; in COORDINATION, in 10 items mean absolute error terms differ from 
zero with p < 0.05. Mann-Whitney-U tests are conducted to test for differences between treatments. 
Before the correction procedure, item C6 differs between BENCHMARK and CONTROL (p < 0.05) 
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and items C3 (p < 0.1), C5 (p < 0.01) and A1 (p < 0.05) differ between COORDINATION and 
CONTROL. None of these differences survives the correction procedure. 
 
Table 5. Analysis of Error Terms on the Item Level 
Panel A. Mean Error Terms 𝜀?̅? 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Benchmark -2,5 -2,7 0,0 2,4 -0,9 -1,7 1,4 0,3 3,0 3,3 2,5 -1,9 
Coordination 0,5 -3,6 0,5 1,0 1,2 -0,2 -5,4 -1,2 -2,6 -1,0 -2,0 2,3 
Control -1,6 -0,6 -1,5 1,4 0,1 -0,2 -0,2 -4,5 -3,1 -3,3 -5,2 -7,9 
Panel B. Mean Absolute Error Terms |𝜀𝑗|
̅̅ ̅̅̅ 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Benchmark 10,0 12,8 10,8 9,0 6,6 3,7 1,8 13,3 14,6 12,6 9,7 10,0 
Coordination 7,9 15,0 12,7 15,5 8,1 3,7 6,1 12,0 11,0 8,1 5,3 3,0 
Control 5,4 13,8 9,7 8,2 3,6 0,5 0,5 10,6 12,6 11,4 11,1 13,9 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. Error terms are defined as the difference between statements in stage 1 and 
stage 2 in treatment BENCHMARK, COORDINATION and CONTROL. Absolute error terms are the absolute values 
of error terms. Panel A and Panel B report the means of these two measures on the item level. 
 
A.2. Results of Treatment Survey 
Graphical analysis (figure 4) as well as mean Brier scores (table 6) indicate a lower external validity 
of SURVEY, compared to BELIEF, BENCHMARK, and COORDINATION. The number of 
participants, however, is not sufficient to draw statistical inferences on that question. 
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Figure 4. Extracted Beliefs and Factual Data of TK (2014) 
 
Notes: Numbers are percentage points. C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice behavior of proposers and A1-A6 
refer to probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. The numbers in BENCHMARK and COORDINATION 
are elicited in the first stage of the treatments, i.e., using the respective mechanisms. 
 
Table 6. Mean Brier Scores 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Belief 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.06 
Benchmark 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 
Coordination 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Survey 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.13 
Notes: The table contains mean Brier scores on the item level. Items C1-C6 refer to probabilities for choice behavior 
of proposers and A1-A6 refer to probabilities for acceptance behavior of responders. Lower scores represent higher 
levels of accuracy. 
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